In the following is a FRANK & BOLD article with an
ACCURATE and LUCID ANALYSIS of a widespread "ISLAMOPHOBIA",an article
that seems to have appeared in a REPUTED
NATIONAL DAILY like The Hindu after ages!
ACCURATE and LUCID ANALYSIS of a widespread "ISLAMOPHOBIA",an article
that seems to have appeared in a REPUTED
NATIONAL DAILY like The Hindu after ages!
authors like SUCHITRA VIJAYAN GROW in all corners of the world and more so
in INDIA!
Islamic
difference and radicalization –The Hindu, January 7, 2015
AP
REPRESSIVE:
“The Hindu nationalist discourse rallied around the claim that Muslims
threatened Hindus.” Picture shows a man waiting for his turn to be heard by the
Nanavati Commission after the Gujarat riots.
“The Hindu nationalist discourse rallied around the claim that Muslims
threatened Hindus.” Picture shows a man waiting for his turn to be heard by the
Nanavati Commission after the Gujarat riots.
The
radicalisation discourse in India has overwhelmingly contributed to normalising
prejudice and dehumanising an entire community
“Radicalisation”
has become the standard term used to describe “what goes on before the bomb
goes off.” Radicalisation as a precursor to terrorism, and in certain cases
even a root cause of terrorism and socio-political violence, is a mainstay
among pundits, policymakers and journalists alike. However, the immense
popularity of the concept represents no direct relationship to its actual
explanatory power regarding what causes terrorism. Instead, aphorisms on
radicalisation have emptied the term of its analytical value, so that the label
of “radicalisation,” as concept and as an industry, has become an extremely
powerful and destructive political label employed against Muslim communities in
India and elsewhere. It allows for the stigmatisation of Muslims, their
exclusion from political processes, and for the state and the media to engage
in a process of differentiating ‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’ — unless
proved to be good, every Muslim is considered to be bad.
has become the standard term used to describe “what goes on before the bomb
goes off.” Radicalisation as a precursor to terrorism, and in certain cases
even a root cause of terrorism and socio-political violence, is a mainstay
among pundits, policymakers and journalists alike. However, the immense
popularity of the concept represents no direct relationship to its actual
explanatory power regarding what causes terrorism. Instead, aphorisms on
radicalisation have emptied the term of its analytical value, so that the label
of “radicalisation,” as concept and as an industry, has become an extremely
powerful and destructive political label employed against Muslim communities in
India and elsewhere. It allows for the stigmatisation of Muslims, their
exclusion from political processes, and for the state and the media to engage
in a process of differentiating ‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’ — unless
proved to be good, every Muslim is considered to be bad.
Judgements
are increasingly being passed on entire communities based on acts of
individuals; Muslim political identity has become increasingly linked to their
religious faith.
are increasingly being passed on entire communities based on acts of
individuals; Muslim political identity has become increasingly linked to their
religious faith.
The
earlier discourse on terrorism focussed on the circumstances, the ideology, the
group, and the individual. However, following the September 11, 2001 terror
attacks, the term radicalisation privileged the individual and to some extent
the ideology, but neglected to investigate the wider historical, social, and
geopolitical circumstances. An analytical investigation of the root causes of
terror became almost impossible post-9/11 in the face of growing Islamophobia
and the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them.’
earlier discourse on terrorism focussed on the circumstances, the ideology, the
group, and the individual. However, following the September 11, 2001 terror
attacks, the term radicalisation privileged the individual and to some extent
the ideology, but neglected to investigate the wider historical, social, and
geopolitical circumstances. An analytical investigation of the root causes of
terror became almost impossible post-9/11 in the face of growing Islamophobia
and the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them.’
The
discourse reduced radicalisation largely to a sense of Islamic ‘difference.’
Often this ‘difference’ was explained in terms of ‘lack of integration,’ ‘lack
of secularism,’ or ‘external Islamic influences’ from Saudi Arabia among Muslim
communities. Following the logic of difference, it is still argued that the
exploitation of these differences culminates in terrorism, either by passively
rationalising violence or by explicitly abetting it.
discourse reduced radicalisation largely to a sense of Islamic ‘difference.’
Often this ‘difference’ was explained in terms of ‘lack of integration,’ ‘lack
of secularism,’ or ‘external Islamic influences’ from Saudi Arabia among Muslim
communities. Following the logic of difference, it is still argued that the
exploitation of these differences culminates in terrorism, either by passively
rationalising violence or by explicitly abetting it.
Historicity of Islam
What this discourse repeatedly fails to understand is the complex and rich
historicity of Islam in South Asia. Muslims in India are socially diverse: each
city, each district, each village and each family carries a personal history
that is a product of long, complex political encounters. Their responses to
acts of the state as well as their political beliefs are based on those vastly
varying histories. Yet, the global exclusionary narratives which marked Muslims
as a potential threat to the state were incorporated into the security and
radicalisation discourses. The 2003 report of the International Initiative for
Justice articulates this in its conclusion: “What follows then is an easy
subliminal association of Muslim-Terrorist-Aggressor… The idea of exacting
collective punishment against an entire community for the actions of unrelated
individuals, or of attacking a much weaker and numerically smaller group in the
name of “self-defence” has acquired new validity in the post-September 11
scenario.”
What this discourse repeatedly fails to understand is the complex and rich
historicity of Islam in South Asia. Muslims in India are socially diverse: each
city, each district, each village and each family carries a personal history
that is a product of long, complex political encounters. Their responses to
acts of the state as well as their political beliefs are based on those vastly
varying histories. Yet, the global exclusionary narratives which marked Muslims
as a potential threat to the state were incorporated into the security and
radicalisation discourses. The 2003 report of the International Initiative for
Justice articulates this in its conclusion: “What follows then is an easy
subliminal association of Muslim-Terrorist-Aggressor… The idea of exacting
collective punishment against an entire community for the actions of unrelated
individuals, or of attacking a much weaker and numerically smaller group in the
name of “self-defence” has acquired new validity in the post-September 11
scenario.”
“The state and the media engage in a process of differentiating
‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’ — unless proved to be good, every Muslim is
considered to be bad”
‘good Muslims’ from ‘bad Muslims’ — unless proved to be good, every Muslim is
considered to be bad”
The
discourse of radicalisation regularly turns people into religious and cultural
categories. It is tacitly implied that social and political behaviour is a
residue of one’s religious and cultural beliefs. The unofficial mandate of
securing India is equated with the task of preventing “Muslim terrorist
infiltration” in India. It is not just about combating militancy, terror or
insurgency; it is Islamic militancy, Islamic terror and Islamic insurgency.
Logic follows that before you identify the terrorist you have to identify the
Muslim.
discourse of radicalisation regularly turns people into religious and cultural
categories. It is tacitly implied that social and political behaviour is a
residue of one’s religious and cultural beliefs. The unofficial mandate of
securing India is equated with the task of preventing “Muslim terrorist
infiltration” in India. It is not just about combating militancy, terror or
insurgency; it is Islamic militancy, Islamic terror and Islamic insurgency.
Logic follows that before you identify the terrorist you have to identify the
Muslim.
Islamophobia in India
Islamophobia, an irrational fear or prejudice towards Islam and Muslims, exists
across the world. In India this takes a specific Hindu-Muslim dimension. In
India, the Hindu nationalist discourse began gaining popularity in the 1980s.
This discourse sought to remake India as a Hindu state, rallied around the
claim that Muslims were appeased by the state and that Muslim minorities
threatened Hindus.
Islamophobia, an irrational fear or prejudice towards Islam and Muslims, exists
across the world. In India this takes a specific Hindu-Muslim dimension. In
India, the Hindu nationalist discourse began gaining popularity in the 1980s.
This discourse sought to remake India as a Hindu state, rallied around the
claim that Muslims were appeased by the state and that Muslim minorities
threatened Hindus.
The
constant depiction of Muslims as the “problematic other” plays a major role in
dehumanising the entire community. The act of systematic dehumanisation of a
community has historically been used to justify mass violence as retaliation,
and shifts the burden of responsibility for the violence on the marginalised
communities. The radicalisation discourse not only defines itself in opposition
to the “other,” but often engages in violence against this “other.” In India,
the discourse has overwhelmingly contributed to the normalisation of prejudice,
dehumanisation of an entire community, legitimated violence and enabled a
steady erosion of rights.
constant depiction of Muslims as the “problematic other” plays a major role in
dehumanising the entire community. The act of systematic dehumanisation of a
community has historically been used to justify mass violence as retaliation,
and shifts the burden of responsibility for the violence on the marginalised
communities. The radicalisation discourse not only defines itself in opposition
to the “other,” but often engages in violence against this “other.” In India,
the discourse has overwhelmingly contributed to the normalisation of prejudice,
dehumanisation of an entire community, legitimated violence and enabled a
steady erosion of rights.
Following
9/11 and the attacks on the Indian Parliament buildings, India enacted the
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA). POTA inherited many of the
provisions found in the earlier Act, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA), which remained in effect from 1985 to 1995. While POTA
was repealed in 2004, some of POTA’s key provisions remain preserved.
9/11 and the attacks on the Indian Parliament buildings, India enacted the
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA). POTA inherited many of the
provisions found in the earlier Act, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA), which remained in effect from 1985 to 1995. While POTA
was repealed in 2004, some of POTA’s key provisions remain preserved.
POTA
was framed and adopted with strong ideological and political content. It was
repressive and authoritarian in its conception, legal framework and
implementation, and was informed by a specific notion of the terror problem,
which was centred on “Muslim militancy.” It was a “violence of jurisprudence”
that was inflicted on India’s body politic, where law became the midwife of
organising state violence. TADA institutionalised the general suspicion towards
the Muslim minority. With the passing of POTA, it seemed to many Muslims that
they were excluded from the due process of law and refused recourse to judicial
processes.
was framed and adopted with strong ideological and political content. It was
repressive and authoritarian in its conception, legal framework and
implementation, and was informed by a specific notion of the terror problem,
which was centred on “Muslim militancy.” It was a “violence of jurisprudence”
that was inflicted on India’s body politic, where law became the midwife of
organising state violence. TADA institutionalised the general suspicion towards
the Muslim minority. With the passing of POTA, it seemed to many Muslims that
they were excluded from the due process of law and refused recourse to judicial
processes.
Julia
Eckert, researcher and political scientist, wrote on POTA: “On February 28,
2002, in Godhra [...] a compartment of the Sabarmati Express train was burned.
The fire killed 57 people...Under POTA, 131 Muslims were charged. Initially,
the police filed a case under ordinary criminal law, but by September 2002, six
months after the event, the government of Gujarat under Narendra Modi of the
BJP decided to treat the attack on the train as an act of terrorism. There is
evidence that the Modi government instructed the police to investigate “the
conspiracy angle” of the fire to have a solid case of premeditated violence
that could more easily be classed under POTA. At the same time, none of the
Hindu rioters who participated in the pogroms that followed the train fire were
charged under POTA. The large scale pogroms left over 2,000 Muslims dead.”
Eckert, researcher and political scientist, wrote on POTA: “On February 28,
2002, in Godhra [...] a compartment of the Sabarmati Express train was burned.
The fire killed 57 people...Under POTA, 131 Muslims were charged. Initially,
the police filed a case under ordinary criminal law, but by September 2002, six
months after the event, the government of Gujarat under Narendra Modi of the
BJP decided to treat the attack on the train as an act of terrorism. There is
evidence that the Modi government instructed the police to investigate “the
conspiracy angle” of the fire to have a solid case of premeditated violence
that could more easily be classed under POTA. At the same time, none of the
Hindu rioters who participated in the pogroms that followed the train fire were
charged under POTA. The large scale pogroms left over 2,000 Muslims dead.”
Both
POTA and TADA have been criticised for criminalising identity. The
criminalisation of Muslim identity continues in India today, along with the
communalisation of nationalism. The Muzaffarnagar riots of 2013 made it clear
that prejudice arising from radicalisation and Islamophobic discourse has a
bearing on the actual killings. Violence robs people of their history. The
consistent denial of justice and social exclusion creates second class
citizenships. In a speech in 1948 in Lucknow, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel said: “I
want to tell them [Muslims] frankly that mere declarations of loyalty to the
Indian Union will not help them at this critical juncture. They must give
practical proof of their declaration.” It is 67 years too late to still demand
of Muslim citizens a practical proof of loyalty.
POTA and TADA have been criticised for criminalising identity. The
criminalisation of Muslim identity continues in India today, along with the
communalisation of nationalism. The Muzaffarnagar riots of 2013 made it clear
that prejudice arising from radicalisation and Islamophobic discourse has a
bearing on the actual killings. Violence robs people of their history. The
consistent denial of justice and social exclusion creates second class
citizenships. In a speech in 1948 in Lucknow, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel said: “I
want to tell them [Muslims] frankly that mere declarations of loyalty to the
Indian Union will not help them at this critical juncture. They must give
practical proof of their declaration.” It is 67 years too late to still demand
of Muslim citizens a practical proof of loyalty.
(Suchitra Vijayan is a barrister, political analyst and a
writer.)
writer.)
Years back, It was undoubtedly a positive and timely move by many a European country to declare 'antisemitism' a crime against humanity. At a critical juncture in history the international community found it urgent and inevitable to speak up against the inhuman sentiments and practices unleashed upon the Jewish community round the globe. Now we see history repeating. Only the characters changed. Those who were persecuted are now the persecuters .Demonizing Muslims took a new turn post 9/11. In India this heinous crime has become even more vulgar and at times riridiculous. The Sangh Pariwar managed to construct an 'other' , a 'legitimized enemy' in Muslims. The new equation formulated these days has been that 'the government itself is the nation'.The pariwar fundamentalists have created not one 9/11, but an umpteen number of the ilk, apart from creating numerous communal violences. Creating bomb blasts and fake encounter killings they have marched to power.Now that the fascists are in power, everything that India as nation stood for has been made topsy turvy. This will lead to self destruction alone. Apart from TADA and POTA, UAPA is causing great havoc. Civil Rights are neglected like anything. Chaos is the law. Citizens are robbed of their fundamental rights to existence. It is high time that we declared 'Islamophobia' a crime against humanity, because no nation can survive demonising and marginalising certain communities and regions. Such radicalising and demonising are applied even in more bloody ways against Dalits and people in border states.This is appalling. We are heading to our doom unless this madness is checked.
ReplyDeleteQudos to Suchitra Vijayan for having spoken up.